Whereas approaches that focus on character and virtue tend to consider how individuals can improve themselves, relational approaches begin from the idea that nobody is truly self-made. All relational ethics starts with particular views about who we are, how we live, and the nature of our psychology (and, indeed, biology) that emphasize relationality. The idea is we all are who we are through our relationships and so ethical decision-making needs to value and pay attention to them. Different traditions take different approaches to thinking about which relations create and constrain our moral lives.
We begin with feminist ethics, which was developed in reaction to the ethical traditions of Europe—especially utilitarianism (section 3.2) and Kantianism (section 4.3) and, to a lesser extent, Aristotelianism (section 5.1)—as well as the political discourse on rights that arose out of these theories (discussed below in Chapter 9). In the 1970s and 1980s, many feminists argued both that nobody is truly fully independent and, furthermore, that people vary significantly in their degree of personal and physical dependency on others, which informs what they can do and how they relate to other people. They also noted that social position and inequality shapes people’s lives and curtails their choices in ways that are ethically relevant. We are going to think about this first kind of relational ethics as focussing on personal relationships and this second kind as focussing on political relationships.
Then we turn to ethical approaches that foreground communal relations. These are less concerned with power than the kinds of relationships that we will consider under the moniker “political.” This approach can be understood through the African idea of ubuntu, which places the community at the centre of moral decision-making. Finally, we will consider relational approaches that go beyond human relationships to all my relations, including those in the more-than-human world. This is an ethical framing that is common in traditional Indigenous value systems throughout what settlers call North America.
6.1 Focus on Personal Relationships
When feminist philosophers began to engage ethical theory in the 1970s, they noticed that the then dominant European approaches seemed to assume that the goal of ethics was to adjudicate conflicts and facilitate decision-making in the public sphere. By this, they meant that these theories only addressed issues that arose outside the home with parties who were mature, independent, impartial adults. The private sphere—i.e., home life, which is characterized by relationships of dependency and partiality—was simply ignored. The feminist critique was twofold. First, ethics needs to address the importance of personal relationships in our lives. Second, humans are, in fact, thoroughly relational beings and the idea that anyone is self-made is simply a myth. Minimally, all humans require huge amounts of care and education at the beginning of our lives if we are to develop into capable adults. Moreover, throughout our lives, we depend on others looking after us and helping us with various activities—from helping us secure work to addressing our most intimate personal needs. This doesn’t mean merely that the kinds of relations we have with others are important causes of how we develop as persons. It also means that these kinds of relations constitute, in large part, who we are.
These ideas gave rise to a distinctive ethical approach called care ethics. Care ethics recognizes that relationships of care—for instance, parents caring for young children—cannot be captured by the ethical theories that have dominated European and European settler societies. After all, young children are not autonomous in a Kantian sense as they do not have the capacity to reason, nor do they have the ability to overcome their inclinations. They are also extremely vulnerable; so, we may have special obligations to our own children because of their vulnerability and because we are in a unique and specific relationship of care with them. Perhaps most importantly of all, the ethical relationships that parents have with their children, indeed that all of us have with family members more generally, are emotional relationships. Caring for a child requires, not impartiality, but rather a thoroughly partial emotional investment in the life and well-being of the child. Love and care are not incidental to these relationships or a fortunate consequence of them; they are the very stuff of them.
A similar idea can also be found in ethics based on the work of Kongfuzi (or Confucian Ethics). Confucianism emphasizes that we learn how to be good people through our relationships with our family members, particularly our parents. We learn moral emotions, such as love, through loving our parents and siblings. The respect and love that we have for our parents is, in effect, the root for the love and respect that we show other people as adults. In this way, Confucians believe that our capacity for humaneness, our moral concern for humanity generally (ren , sometimes translated as human-heartedness), emerges through our personal filial relationships.
6.2 Focus on Political Relations
Although relational ethicists who focus on personal relationships often emphasize the positive ways in which these constitute us, it is important to remember that families can be places of inequality and various kinds of serious harms. Children are not only in need of care but are extraordinarily vulnerable to abuse and neglect. In patriarchal cultures, wives are often seen as subordinate to their husbands and have their freedom curtailed and their interests and needs overlooked or marginalized. Daughters are often similarly devalued.
These patriarchal views of women extend beyond the home. This makes it more difficult for women to leave abusive domestic situations and find better lives elsewhere because they are frequently seen as incompetent or incapable of filling any roles other than those traditionally assigned to women. Moreover, they may have internalized these patriarchal views so that they see themselves (and other women) as being properly subordinate to men and unfit for anything but traditional feminine roles. Such assumptions make it extremely difficult for women to succeed in various professions where they may be assumed to be deficient in virtues associated with men—such as rationality, morality, strength, and competence. Moreover, because traditional women’s roles—including invaluable skilled care labour, such as growing or obtaining and cooking food, cleaning, and childcare—are devalued or characterized as essentially female, men often refuse to take on these roles, as they find them demeaning, or they lack the relevant skills. The feminist slogan, the personal is political, refers to the way in which inequality in our personal relationships scales up to produce inequality in our society and inequality in our society scales down and affects almost every aspect of our daily lives. “Political” in this sense isn’t really about who you vote for but, in the words of a famous political theorist, “who gets what, when, how.”
Early feminist theories addressing the injustices of patriarchy were often criticized for only voicing the perspectives of straight, white, Anglo, settler, middle-class women without disabilities. Many of the women overlooked by these theories pointed out that they often experienced inequality quite differently. For instance, some suggested that poor women enjoyed greater equality with poor men than middle-class women did with middle-class men but greater inequality overall. Poor women did not long for access to the public sphere of work outside the home as they already worked outside the home, albeit often for wages significantly lower than men’s wages. Many women maintained that much of the discrimination they faced had more to do with their racial or ethnic identity, their class, their sexuality, or their disability status than their gender. Moreover, not infrequently, this discrimination was enacted or exacerbated by more privileged women, some of whom claimed to be feminists.
US legal scholar, Kimberlé Crenshaw, coined the term intersectionality to capture this idea. She recognized that in societies that have multiple axes of oppression—such as racism, colonialism, ableism, hetero- and cissexism, and classism—people who belong to more than one oppressed group often experience oppression in distinctive ways that are highly particular. These patterns of oppression can be difficult to predict and understand from the perspective of those who do not share similar social positionings and experiences.
It’s tempting to think of oppression as additive, so that the more oppressed groups you belong to the worse off you will be. But, as Crenshaw notes, this is not always true because the ways that social identities intersect are complicated. Can you think of an example of intersectional identities where oppression (or privilege) isn’t additive?
If we are committed to equality for all, we must pay attention to intersectional issues. This type of analysis highlights the fact that we are all located in complex webs of social power and privilege. While in an ideal world we might be able to treat everyone (outside our friends and family) impartially, in societies that are structured by patterns of injustice and inequality that disadvantage particular groups, we need to take the reality of these political relationships into account when we are making ethical decisions.
Because it is often difficult for those who are privileged in a certain respect to understand the true challenges and restrictions on those who aren’t, it is particularly important to have people who experience oppression involved in decision-making about policies intended to address that oppression. Disability rights advocates coined the phrase “nothing about us without us” to capture this idea. This is not only a call to inclusion but also a call to those allies who wish to support their cause to exercise humility—a warning that well-intentioned paternalism can actually exacerbate harms and inequality and undermine the autonomy of those whom one wishes to help. Understanding how the complex political relationships that we have with each other inform various ethical challenges and dilemmas is key to this relational approach to ethics.
6.3 Focus on Communal Relations
While political approaches to relational ethics attend to the many social and political differences between us, communal approaches focus on the collective.
It is quite common in ethical theories outside the European tradition to focus more on the community than the individual (indeed, we have already seen a version of it with Mohism in section 3.1) and is often part of critiques of that tradition. The concept of ubuntu is a good example, as it both rejects European individualism; it has been employed as a post-colonial ethical anchor for rebuilding more just communities and positive relationships in African societies recently freed from colonial oppression. In South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation process—set up to document and deal with the appalling human rights abuses that happened under apartheid—ubuntu has been an important principle that has shaped how this process of restorative justice has been understood.
Although, as South African jurist, Yvonne Mokgoro notes, ubuntu is not easily definable, particularly in a foreign tongue, there are, nonetheless, a number of sayings and stories that point to the central idea. The Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission quotes Ms. Susan van der Merwe, whose husband was murdered in 1978:
The Tswanas have an idiom which I learned from my husband which goes “a person is a person by other people, a person is only a person with other people.” We do have this duty to each other. The survival of our people in this country depends on our co-operation with each other. My plea to you is, help people throw their weapons away…No person’s life is a waste. Every person’s life is too precious.
Thus, ubuntu is associated with harmony and solidarity at the level of the group with processes aimed at adjudicating conflict focussed on the restoration of peace in the community. As Mokgoro notes:
Group solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity, humanistic orientation and collective unity have, among others been defined as key social values of ubuntu….[I]ts value has also been viewed as a basis for a morality of co-operation, compassion, communalism and concern for the interests of the collective respect for the dignity of personhood, all the time emphasising the virtues of that dignity in social relationships and practices.
Thus, ubuntu not only emphasizes a strong relational ethics that focuses on the community, it is also deeply humanist. Ubuntu recognizes that one’s own humanity is inextricably bound with the humanity of others.
6.4 Focus on All My Relations
While the other three approaches in this chapter typically foreground different types of relationships between humans, the last includes these but goes beyond to consider relationships with the more-than-human world. This is the approach exemplified by the phrase all my relations that is central to the worldview and ethical orientation of many Indigenous peoples in what settlers have called North America. This perspective emphasizes not only the reality of our physical, psychological, and spiritual dependence on the many different beings in the world around us but also our capacity to affect these beings. For many Indigenous traditions, it is not only nonhuman animals who are included in these relations but plants and parts of the non-organic world also.
Importantly, the relations acknowledged are not simply relations of interdependency but also relationships of respect. For instance, many traditional Mi’kmaw stories identify ways that plants and animals guide and teach humans. These stories recognize that nonhuman beings do not exist to serve humans but have their own moral status that demands respect. Failing to respect other beings can bring disastrous results to those humans who ignore their obligations to the more-than-human world. This ethical orientation brings with it gratitude to those beings who sustain our lives and a commitment to sustaining theirs. When one takes something from the world one should only take what is needed, which not only shows respect for what is taken but also ensures that there is plenty for others (human and nonhuman, alike). Reciprocity is often emphasized with the view that one should give back for the gifts that one receives. In this way, relationships remain mutually beneficial. Just as ubuntu emphasizes the value of harmony in the human community, all my relations emphasizes the value of harmony of humans with each other as well as the many other beings in our world.
An adjacent idea in Indigenous cultures is the seven generations teaching. The seventh generation holds significance for many Indigenous peoples, such as the Anishinabek, Ojibway, and Haudenosaunee . When thinking about what we should do, this teaching recommends that we consider the actions and traditions of the previous seven generations and the effect of our actions on the seven generations after us. The foundational principle of this teaching is that our choices, actions, and mistakes have a ripple effect throughout history. As Ojibway thinkers, Linda Clarkson, Vern Morisette, and Gabriel Régallet explain:
There is a teaching passed down from our ancestors that crystallizes our sense of responsibility and our relationship to the earth that arises out of the original law. It is said that we are placed on the earth (our Mother) to be the caretakers of all that is here. We are instructed to deal with the plants, animals, minerals, human beings and all life, as if they were a part of ourselves. Because we are a part of Creation, we cannot differentiate or separate ourselves from the rest of the earth. The way in which we interact with the earth, how we utilize the plants, animals and the mineral gifts, should be carried out with the seventh generation in mind. We cannot simply think of ourselves and our survival; each generation has a responsibility to “ensure the survival for the seventh generation”.
In considering our relation to the generations before us and the ones after us, the seven generations teaching emphasizes the connection with our ancestors and descendants. We live in a continuum, with each of us having parents, grandparents, and great grandparents (who, in turn, had parents, grandparents, and great grandparents), who we learn from and sometimes teach; and many of us have children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren (and some of them will have children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren), who we teach and learn from. Some of us will spend time in every role. Everyone has a responsibility to learn from and teach past and present generations. Awareness of this interconnectedness within the community encourages one to act selflessly and sustainably for future generations.
Importantly, the seven generations teaching is not only forward looking, but it also emphasizes the importance of continuity with traditional and cultural origins. Failure to know and consider one’s place in one’s cultural history and traditions leads to alienation and an inability to understand one’s own life. Knowing who you are and how you fit in the world is important for making ethical choices. Moreover, in knowing our history and traditions, we can avoid making the same mistakes as our ancestors. Such history and tradition should inform, guide, and support our present choices as we think about our impacts on future generations. We have a responsibility to bridge the gap between our past and future—by upholding and maintaining tradition, learning from our ancestors, and passing traditions to our descendants. The responsibility to all our relations is inherited from one’s ancestors and passed onto future generations, solidifying one’s bond with their community.
Suppose we brought the seven generations teaching to our approaches that focus on consequences.
How would that change the way that we thought about the consequences of our possible actions?
In addition to the sources in the footnotes, the following may be helpful:
Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice, Harvard University Press, 1982.
There is a nice excerpt of In a Different Voice in Russ Shafer-Landau’s Ethical Theory: An Anthology (2nd Edition, 2012, Wiley-Blackwell).
Noddings, Nell. “An Ethic of Caring.” In Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, 79-103. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
Tao, Julia Po-Wah-Lai. “Two Perspectives of Care: Confucian Ren and Feminist Care.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2000): 215-40.
Van Norden, Bryan W. Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
See Part 2 “Kongzi and Ruism.”
Warburton, Nigel, and Aidan Turner. “Aidan Turner on Confucian Ancestor Worship.” BBC, 2015, Video. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02xbx9q
Wong, David. “Chinese Ethics.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, last modified September 14, 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/ethics-chinese
See esp. §2.3-2.4.
Calhoun, Cheshire. “Justice, Care, and Gender Bias.” The Journal of Philosophy 85, no. 9 (1988): 451-63. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026802
Collins, Patricia Hills. Intersectionality as Critical Social Theory. London: Duke University Press, 2019.
Norlock, Kathryn. “Feminist Ethics.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, published May 27, 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/feminism-ethics
Sherwin, Susan. “Ethics, ‘Feminine’ Ethics, and Feminist Ethics.” In No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care, 35-57. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992.
Bell, Daniel A. and Thaddeus Metz. “Confucianism and Ubuntu: Reflections on a Dialogue Between Chinese and African Traditions.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38, no. 1 (2011): 78-95.
Masina, Nomonde. “Xhosa Practices of Ubuntu for South Africa.” In Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict ‘Medicine’, edited by I. William Zartman, 169-181. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
Metz, Thaddeus, and Joseph B.R. Gai, “The African Ethic of Ubuntu/ Botho: Implications for Research on Morality,” Journal of Moral Education 39, no. 3 (September 2010): 273-90. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2010.497609
Murove, Munyaradzi Felix, ed. African Ethics: An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics. Scottsville: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2009.
Read esp. Part II Primacy of Ubuntu in African Ethics, Chapter 4-6.
All My Relations
Brant, Clare. “Native Ethics & Principles.” Cape Breton University. 1982. https://www.cbu.ca/indigenous-affairs/mikmaq-resource-centre/mikmaq-resource-guide/essays/native-ethics-principles/
“Episode #1: All My Relations & Indigenous Feminism.” All My Relations. February 26, 2019. Podcast. https://www.allmyrelationspodcast.com/podcast/episode/32b0bd95/ep-1-all-my-relations-and-indigenous-feminism
Government of Alberta. “All My Relations – Well-being.” https://www.learnalberta.ca/content/aswt/well_being/documents/all_my_relations.pdf
Native American History. “How Native Americans Made Decisions For The Future: 7 Generations Rule.” YouTube. November 6, 2020. Video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PcDeoTKGXcw
- John M. Koller, Asian Philosophies, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 2002), 220. ↵
- Koller, Asian Philosophies, 222. Confucianism is a good example of an ethical theory that employs many of the different approaches we have discussed here. From these filial relationships come specific duties. The humaneness that follows from filial piety is, in effect, a virtuous character, which is valuable, in part, because it brings about good consequences. ↵
- Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What When How. New York:
- Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991): 1241–1299. ↵
- Anne-Marie Callus and Amy Camilleri-Zahra, “‘Nothing About Us Without Us’: Disabled People Determining their Human Rights Through the UNCRPD,” Mediterranean Review of Human Rights 1 (2017): 1-26, https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/ bitstream/123456789/56964/1/MHRR1A1.pdf. ↵
- Michael Onyebuchi Eze, “I am Because You Are,” UNESCO Courier (2011): 11-13, https://en.unesco.org/courier/octobre-decembre-2011/i-am-because-you-are. ↵
- Desmond Tutu, et al., Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, vol. 1 (South Africa: Government of National Unity, 1998), 125-8, https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/. ↵
- Yvonne Mokgoro, “Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa,” Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1, no. 1 (1998): 18. https://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/view/43567 ↵
- Tutu, Truth and Reconciliation, 128. ↵
- Mokgoro, “Ubuntu,” 24-5. ↵
- Mokgoro, 19. ↵
- Margaret Robinson, “Animal Personhood in Mi’kmaq Perspective,” Societies 4 (2014): 672–88. https://www.mdpi.com/2075-4698/4/4/672. ↵
- John Borrows, Seven Generations, Seven Teachings Ending the Indian Act (West Vancouver: National Centre for First Nations Governance, 2008), https://fngovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/john_borrows.pdf; Linda Clarkson, Vern Morrisette, and Gabriel Régallet, Our Responsibility to the Seventh Generation: Indigenous Peoples and Sustainable Development (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2001), https://www.iisd.org/publications/our-responsibility-seventh-generation; “Seven Generations – the Role of Chief,” PBS, https://www.pbs.org/warrior/content/timeline/opendoor/roleOfChief.html. ↵
- Clarkson, Morrisette, and Régallet, "Seventh Generation," 12. ↵
- Academic Algonquin, “Seven Generations,” YouTube, video, May 18, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHg3enCCyCM. ↵
A feminist ethic that emphasizes our vulnerability and dependence on one another and argues that these relationships should be central to ethical considerations
A philosophical school based on the work of Kongfuzi (Confucius) that (among other things) emphasizes the importance of developing ethical capacities from our relationships with our parents and families
A feminist slogan that captures the ways in which our personal situation and actions reproduce (or resist) the structural inequality of our society
The unique way that individuals experience oppression (and privilege) due to their membership in various social groups
A disability rights slogan that demands the inclusion of individuals with disabilities in designing studies and decision-making that affect people with disabilities; also used by other social justice movements
Restricting someone's autonomy by ignoring or overriding their preferences or decisions; paternalism is often defended by saying that the paternalistic decision is in the best interests of those whose autonomy is overridden
A type of communal ethics that maintains that a person is a person through other people; associated with African ethics and especially South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation process
A teaching shared by a number of peoples indigenous to what settlers call North America that emphasizes how one must consider and respect their relation to all other living and non-living beings
A teaching shared by a number of peoples indigenous to what settlers call North America that requires one to consider the previous seven generations and future seven generations in one's decisions and actions