General Rules
3 Subsequent Citations: Ibid/Supra
Overview
If a source is referred to multiple times in a document, ibid or supra are used following the first full citation rather than repeating the full citation every time the same source is relied upon.
Ibid is an abbreviation for the Latin word ibīdem, meaning “in the same place.”
Supra (suprā) is the Latin word for “above.”
Ibid
Ibid is used as a quick reference to the immediately preceding citation. It shortens the citation for ease of reading.
The abbreviation “ibid” is always italicized in a citation.
Ibid refers to the exact citation above. Include a new pinpoint in an ibid unless it is the same as the preceding citation.
Ibid can be followed by another ibid if the source remains the same.
Ibid can follow a supra.
In-text: Do not use ibid for in-text references.
Footnote: Use ibid to cite the immediately preceding footnote. Change the pinpoint if necessary. Do not use ibid if you have cited more than one source in the previous footnote as it will not be clear which source the ibid refers to.
Examples: Ibid
The ibid and the source the ibid is referring to are highlighted in the same colour. For example, the Canada Health Act and the subsequent ibid are highlighted in yellow.
1 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 241.
2 Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5.
3 Jocelyn Downie et al, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 4th ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2011) at 46.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid at 64.
6 Canada Health Act, RSC 1985, c C-6 [CHA].
7 Ibid, s 18.
Supra
Supra is used when referring to a source that has previously been cited, but the full citation is not immediately preceding the current citation.
Supra refers to the first citation without a pinpoint (e.g. refers to a statute generally without reference to a specific section). Include a pinpoint even if it is the same as the first citation. Do not include a pinpoint if the source is being referred to generally.
Supra is always italicized in a citation.
Supra is used to refer to the footnote # of the first reference and full citation of a source.
Supra cannot refer to an ibid.
Examples: Supra
The supra and the citation of the source it is referring to are highlighted in the same colour. For example, supra note 1 to the Criminal Code, both the supra and the Criminal Code are highlighted in orange.
1 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 241 [Code].
2 Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5 [Carter].
3 Jocelyn Downie et al, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 4th ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2011) at 46.
4 Code, supra note 1, s 14.
5 Canada Health Act, RSC 1985, c C-6.
6 Carter, supra note 2 at para 54.
7 Downie, supra note 3 at 46.
8 Rodriguez v British Columbia (AG), [1993] 3 SCR 59 at 561, 1993 CanLII 75.
9 Carter, supra note 2 at para 5.
Ibid & Supra in Action
Ibid may refer another ibid.
Ibid may refer to a supra.
Supra cannot refer to an ibid.
Examples: Ibid & Supra
Edited excerpt from Camille Cameron, Riley Weyman, and Claire Nicholson, “Legal Hurdles and Pathways: The Evolution (Progress?) of Climate Change Adjudication in Canada” (2024) 47:2 Dal LJ 1 at 14–16.
Supras to the original source are highlighted in yellow.
Ibids to a supra with a new pinpoint are highlighted in aqua.
Ibids to a citation with the same pinpoint.
Principles of Fundamental Justice (PFJs)
The PFJs reflect “the basic principles that underlie our notions of justice and fair process.”72 The PFJ analysis is step two of the section 7 test. PFJs are a “qualifier” of section 7 rights—a section 7 challenge can only succeed if the deprivation is not in accordance with PFJs.73 The list of PFJs is not closed, but section 7 jurisprudence has evolved around three: arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross disproportionality.74 Courts may recognize new PFJs if the new principle “[is] a legal principle about which there is a significant societal consensus that it is fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate, and it must be identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person.”75 This is a stringent test and it is rare for Canadian courts to recognize a new substantive PFJ.76
In Mathur, the applicants claimed that the Target violates the PFJs against arbitrariness and gross disproportionality, and violates the societal preservation principle, which they argued should be recognized as a new PFJ.77 In rejecting the applicants’ arguments, Vermette J noted that arbitrariness and gross disproportionality are not well adapted to positive rights claims because they are not premised on government inaction or on action that falls short.78 She held that the societal preservation principle does not meet the test to be recognized as a PFJ, as it is not a legal principle and does not relate to the legal system or its fair operation.79 Despite rejecting their arguments, Vermette J identified the difficult task the applicants were faced with as they were forced to fit their novel climate claims into existing legal boxes. She noted that “some of the traditional principles of fundamental justice may need to be adapted when applied in a positive claim context, and new ones may be recognized.”80
Scholars have similarly argued that the section 7 test, and more specifically the PFJ analysis, must evolve to enable courts to recognize positive rights. Suzy Flader argues that since the majority of the SCC’s refusal to recognize positive section 7 rights in Gosselin, “[i]t is thus difficult, if not impossible, to imagine another case persuading a court to find a positive section 7 right using the current legal framework.”81 Flader’s solution is for the courts to recognize equality as a new PFJ.82 She acknowledges that this risks too much overlap between sections 7 and 15 of the Charter, but argues this approach would allow section 15 to serve its “unique Charter role,” as sections 7 and 15 protect against “qualitatively different” harms.83 While she was not writing in the context of climate change claims, this offers an intriguing potential fix for climate change cases, which are predominantly youth-led and often include section 15 equality rights arguments. In the climate change context, the equality PFJ would apply to youth and future generations. Considering such a principle in the context of a case like Mathur, an equality-focused principle would allow for the balancing of competing equality interests between, for example, youth claimants on behalf of themselves and future generations, and a province with inadequate emissions reduction targets. Flader states that “this balancing … should ultimately favour the party who faces the greater social and economic barriers.”84 This approach might also, as Flader suggests, assist in facilitating novel claims, especially positive rights claims which have largely been unable to pass the PFJ part of the section 7 test.85
72 Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at para 19. See also Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, 1985 CanLII 81 (SCC) at para 31 [BC Motor Vehicle Act].
73 BC Motor Vehicle Act, supra note 72 at para 24.
74 Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5 at para 72. See also Suzy Flader, “Fundamental Rights for All: Toward Equality as a Principle of Fundamental Justice Under Section 7 of the Charter” (2020) 25 Appeal 43 at 47.
75 Mathur Merits Hearing, supra note 1 at para 164, citing R v Malmo-Levine, 2003 SCC 74 at para 113; Canada (AG) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2015 SCC 7 at para 87.
76 See e.g. Chaoulli, supra note 27 at para 193, Binnie and Lebel JJ, dissenting.
77 Mathur Merits Hearing, supra note 1 at paras 55-57.
78 Ibid at paras 160-162.
79 Ibid at paras 165-170
80 Ibid at para 140.
81 Flader, supra note 74 at 55, 57. See also Wayne MacKay, “Social and Economic Rights in Canada: What Are They, and Who Can Best Protect Them” (2009) 45 Supreme Court L Rev 385 at 409-411.
82 See generally Flader, supra note 74. For an analysis of how equality meets the test to be recognized as a new PFJ see Kerri A Froc, “Constitutional Coalescence: Substantive Equality as a Principle of Fundamental Justice” (2011) 42 Ottawa L Rev 411, 436-444.
83 Flader, supra note 74 at 59-60.
84 Ibid at 58.
85 Ibid.
